The Use of the Necessity Defense by Abortion Clinic Protesters by Boxerman, Arlene D.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 81
Issue 3 Fall Article 7
Fall 1990
The Use of the Necessity Defense by Abortion
Clinic Protesters
Arlene D. Boxerman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Arlene D. Boxerman, The Use of the Necessity Defense by Abortion Clinic Protesters, 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 677 (1990-1991)
0091-4169/90/8103-677
THEJOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 81, No. 3
Copyright 0 1990 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
COMMENTARY
The Use of the Necessity Defense by
Abortion Clinic Protesters
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 3, 1987, Ann O'Brien and six companions entered the
waiting room of Reproductive Health Services, a St. Louis abortion
clinic, and began shouting anti-abortion slogans.1 O'Brien refused
to leave upon being asked, and was subsequently arrested and
charged with criminal trespass.2 She pleaded "not guilty," and
moved for permission to present evidence regarding a defense of
"justification" or "necessity," on the grounds that her actions were
undertaken "solely to rescue, or protect, particular unborn children
from death to be brought about by the abortion procedure."
O'Brien's motion was denied. She was convicted of criminal tres-
pass and sentenced to serve seventy-five days in a medium security
institution.4 O'Brien appealed the trial judge's denial of her motion
to raise a necessity defense to the Missouri Court of Appeals. 5
The necessity defense is a criminal law defense in which a de-
fendant claims that his or her commission of a crime was necessary
to prevent a "greater harm" from occurring. 6 O'Brien's attempted
use of the necessity defense was not novel. Since at least 1978, anti-
abortion activists have been attempting to raise the necessity de-
fense to criminal trespass charges arising out of abortion clinic dem-
onstrations. The activists generally argue that their criminal acts
were necessary to save the lives of fetuses that were about to be
1 Brief of Respondent at 4, State v. O'Brien, 784 8.W.2d 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(No. 55582).
2 Id. at 4, app. XII.
3 Brief of Appellant at 7, State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (No.
55582).
4 Id. at 3.
5 Id.
6 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 50, at 381 (1972) [herein-
after W. LAFAVE & A. Scorf].
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aborted.7 Although some trial courts have accepted abortion clinic
protesters' necessity claims,8 appellate courts have uniformly held
that abortion clinic trespassers are precluded, as a matter of law,
from raising a necessity defense. 9 Nevertheless, anti-abortion activ-
ists continue to try raising the defense. 10
In Missouri, the issue appeared to have been settled in 1982,
when the Missouri Court of Appeals held in City of St. Louis v.
Klocker 11 that abortion clinic trespassers could not meet the essential
elements of the necessity defense. 12 O'Brien argued, however, that
Klocker was rendered obsolete by the Missouri General Assembly's
enactment of a new abortion statute13 in 1986.14 This statute's pre-
amble contains "legislative findings" that human life begins at con-
ception and that "unborn children" have protectable interests in
life, health, and well-being.15
According to O'Brien, the preamble to the 1986 Missouri abor-
tion act indicated the Missouri legislature's intent to permit abor-
tion protesters to raise a necessity defense. 16 O'Brien's argument
was bolstered by the fact that on two separate occasions after the
Supreme Court's Webster decision upheld the 1986 abortion act, Mis-
souri trial judges acquitted groups of abortion clinic trespassers on
necessity grounds. 17 Nevertheless, the Missouri Court of Appeals in
7 See Note, Necessity as a Defense to a Charge of Criminal Trespass in an Abortion Clinic, 48
U. CIN. L. REv. 501 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Criminal Trespass in an Abortion Clinic].
8 See infra note 17 and notes 209-210 and accompanying text.
9 State v. Diener, 706 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
10 For example, a group of anti-abortion protesters charged with trespassing at an
abortion clinic in Los Angeles recently attempted to raise a necessity defense. L.A.
Times, Aug. 8, 1989, § 2 (Metro), § 1 at 1, col. 1. The judge prevented the protesters
from presenting the defense to the jury; nonetheless, the jury acquitted the protesters.
L.A. Times, Sept. 14, 1989, § 1 at 1, col. 2.
11 637 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
12 Klocker, 637 S.W.2d at 176-77. For the essential elements of the necessity defense,
see infra section II.B.
13 Act approved June 26, 1986, 1986 Mo. LAws 689.
14 Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 5, State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (No. 55582).
15 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (Vernon Supp. 1989). Although the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals held these "legislative findings" unconstitutional, Reproductive Health Serv-
ices v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), the United States Supreme Court, in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), reinstated the findings
without ruling on their constitutionality.
16 Supplemental Brief of Appellant, supra note 14, at 8.
17 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 29, 1989, at 1. Because Missouri law requires that
all official records pertaining to a criminal case be closed to the public if the defendant is
acquitted, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.105 (Vernon 1988), the author was unable to obtain
any official documentation regarding these cases. One of the trial judges, Associate Cir-
cuit Judge George Gerhard, provided the author with an unofficial copy of his opinion.
The opinion relies heavily on the preamble to the 1986 abortion statute. Opinion of
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State v. O'Brien upheld O'Brien's conviction, ruling that even after
Webster, the necessity defense is unavailable to abortion clinic tres-
passers as a matter of law.
18
This Comment argues that the Missouri Court of Appeals was
correct in ruling that abortion clinic trespassers are precluded from
raising a necessity defense, even after the Webster decision. Sections
one and two review the background and elements of the necessity
defense, both at common law and in statutes. Since anti-abortion
activists are essentially political protesters, section three examines
the state and federal courts' unanimous refusal to accept the neces-
sity defense in political protest cases. Finally, in section four, the
application of the necessity defense to abortion clinic trespassers is
explored. The author notes that under the analysis which courts
apply in general political protest cases, abortion clinic trespassers
are precluded from raising a necessity defense. The author further
argues, however, that the most powerful arguments against allowing
abortion clinic trespassers to raise a necessity defense arise from
factors more closely associated with abortion clinic protests than
with general political protests, including the lack of social consensus
on the abortion issue, the current legal status of fetuses, and the
constitutional protection which the Supreme Court has granted to
abortion rights.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE NEcEssrrY DEFENSE
A. COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT
The necessity defense justifies conduct which is criminal on its
face, but which "promotes some value higher than the value of lit-
eral compliance with the law." 19 It is based on the theory that
"sometimes the greater good for society will be accomplished by
violating the literal language of the criminal law." 20 Thus, the ne-
cessity defense recognizes the societal advantage of encouraging
people to avoid greater harms by bringing about lesser harms.
2 1
Judge George Gerhard, Associate Circuit Judge, St. Louis County Circuit Court, Aug.
16, 1989 [hereinafter Gerhard).
18 State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
19 G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw § 229, at 722 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter G. WIL-
LIAMS]. The necessity defense also is known as the "choice of evils" defense, see W.
LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 6, § 50, at 382; 2 P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES
§ 124, at 45 (1984) [hereinafter P. ROBINSON]; MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985), the
"lesser evils" defense, see P. ROBINSON, this note, § 124, at 45, or the "competing
harms" defense. See Commonwealth v. Hood, 389 Mass. 581, 590, 452 N.E.2d 188, 194
(1983).
20 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 6, § 50, at 382.
21 Id. § 50, at 385; Note, Applying the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience Cases, 64
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The precise development of the necessity defense in Anglo-
American law is unclear, because early necessity cases are scarce. 22
However, the defense appeared early in both English and American
common law.2 3 Originally, the necessity defense was limited to
cases in which the pressure compelling the choice of evils came from
forces of nature.24 More recent cases, however, have broadened the
availability of the necessity defense to include scenarios where the
pressure of circumstances comes from a human source rather than
from nature. For example, some state courts have held that the ne-
cessity defense may be available to prison inmates who escape to
avoid imminent and serious threats of death or assault from other
prisoners. 25 In another case, a court permitted a medical student to
raise a necessity defense to charges of disorderly conduct which
N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 85 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Applying the Necessity Defense]. "Necessity"
is distinct from "duress," although courts often confuse the two. United States v. Bailey,
444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980). The duress defense is available to a person who commits an
illegal act because another person unlawfully threatens him or her with serious injury
unless he or she commits the act. The duress defense is based on the theory that a
person should not be held responsible for a criminal offense which was committed
under pressure great enough to deprive an ordinary person of free will. See Arnolds &
Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 290 (1974) [hereinafter Arnolds & Garland]. In contrast,
the necessity defense assumes that the defendant possessed free will when he or she
committed the charged offenses. The necessity defendant argues that the pressure of
circumstances presented him or her with a choice of evils, and that he or she elected to
avoid the greater harm by bringing about a lesser harm. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra
note 6, § 50, at 382. But see A. WERTHEIMER, COERCION 147 (1987), noting that Black-
stone believed that when a person acts from "reason and reflection" and commits a
criminal act because it is the "least pernicious" of "two evils," his or her will is not
"freely active." Id. (quoting Blackstone, The Elements of the Common Law of England (1630)
in XIII WORKS § 28 (Montague ed. 1830)).
22 Arnolds & Garland, supra note 21, at 291.
23 See Reninger v. Fagossa, [1551] 1 Plowd. 1, 19, 75 Eng. Rep. 1, 29-30 (cited in
Arnolds & Garland, supra note 21, at 291) ("a man may break the words of the law, and
yet not break the law itself ... where the words of them inconvenience, or through neces-
sity, or by compulsion.") (emphasis added). See also The William Gray, 29 F. Cas. 1300
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1810) (No. 17,694).
24 See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 6, § 50, at 381. In one early necessity case,
for example, the court held that a severely storm-damaged ship was justified in entering
a port in violation of embargo laws. The William Gray, 29 F. Cas. 1300 (C.C.D.N.Y.
1810) (No. 17,694). Other early necessity cases held that sailors could justify a mutiny
on the grounds that their ship was unseaworthy, United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873
(C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14,470), that a person may destroy property to prevent a dis-
ease from spreading, Seavy v. Preble, 64 Me. 120 (1874), and that a parent may with-
draw his child from school, in violation of compulsory school attendance laws, if the
child is so ill that attendance would endanger her health. State v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 552,
53 A. 1021 (1902).
25 See, e.g., People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974);
People v. Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 232 N.W.2d 184 (1975); People v. Harmon, 53 Mich.
App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974), aff'd, 394 Mich. 625, 234 N.W.2d 187 (1975).
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arose when he prevented police officers from moving an injured
person without a stretcher. 26 Thus, the necessity defense poten-
tially may apply whenever a person's nominally criminal act pre-
vents more harm than it causes.
27
B. COMMON LAW ELEMENTS
The common law necessity defense is poorly developed in An-
glo-American jurisprudence.28 The cases and literature therefore
are not uniform in defining the defense. A survey of cases and com-
mentaries suggests, however, that the following elements are essen-
tial to establish common law necessity: (1) the criminal offense with
which the actor is charged was committed to avoid a significant evil
or harm;29 (2) the actor reasonably believed that his or her actions
were necessary and designed to avoid this significant harm;30 (3) the
actor had no alternative means of avoiding the threatened harm;
31
(4) the actor was without fault in bringing about the situation calling
for the choice of evils;3 2 (5) the harm which the actor sought to
avoid is greater than the harm reasonably expected to be created by
the criminal offense committed;33 and (6) the legislature has not
made a statutory pre-determination of values for the situation con-
fronting the actor.
34
1. The Harm to be Avoided
Although early necessity cases required that a necessity-trigger-
ing harm come from forces of nature, more recent common law
does not restrict the type of harm which may give rise to a necessity
defense. 35 One commentator has asserted that any unjustifiable
26 City of Chicago v. Mayer, 56 Ill.2d 366, 308 N.E.2d 601 (1974).
27 Arnolds & Garland, supra note 21, at 290. Additional examples of the defense's
application abound. It is generally recognized, for example, that a person may pull
down a building to prevent a fire from spreading, G. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, § 231, at
725, or may jettison cargo to keep a ship from sinking. Id. at 726. In addition, an ambu-
lance may go through a red light on its way to an accident, a mountain climber lost in a
storm may take shelter in a vacant house, and a druggist may dispense medication with-
out a prescription in a medical emergency. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 comment 1, at 9-
10.
28 Arnolds & Garland, supra note 21, at 291.
29 Id. at 294.
30 W. Lafave & A. Scott, supra note 6, § 50, at 386; Note, Criminal Trespass in an Abor-
tion Clinic, supra note 7, at 504.
31 W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-r, supra note 6, § 50, at 387-88; Arnolds & Garland, supra
note 21, at 294.
32 W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-rr, supra note 6, § 50, at 388.
33 Id. at 386-87.
34 Id. at 382-83.
35 Id. at 381, 383. But see Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073,
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threat to a legally protected interest is sufficient to trigger a neces-
sity defense. 36 In addition, the unjustifiable threat need not be an
actual threat, provided the actor has a well-founded belief that im-
pending harm will result unless he or she commits a criminal
offense.
3 7
Several early necessity cases, however, suggest that the defense
applies only in extreme and extraordinary circumstances.A8 The
doctrine of necessity recognizes that "law is made to meet but the
ordinary exigencies of life." 39 The necessity doctrine therefore
deals with the unusual circumstances not contemplated by criminal
law. 40 Courts also have asserted that the threatened harm giving
rise to a choice of evils must be clear and certain, not merely "re-
mote or contingent."
41
2. Reasonable Belief that the Offense was Necessary and Designed to
Avoid the Threatened Harm
A defendant seeking to raise a necessity defense not only must
have been faced with a significant, clear, and certain harm, but also
must have acted with the intention of avoiding this harm. 42 In other
words, the defendant must have believed that his or her criminal act
was necessary to avert the threat.43 A reasonable, but mistaken, belief
in the necessity of the criminal act is sufficient to establish this ele-
ment of the necessity defense. 44
A closely-related requirement is that the defendant reasonably
must have believed that his or her actions would be effective in
averting the threatened harm. 45 This requirement was first articu-
1078 (Alaska 1981) (mistakenly arguing that the harm giving rise to a necessity defense
must come from physical forces of nature.).
36 P. ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 124(b).
37 In one case, for example, a group of sailors sought to justify mutiny on the
grounds that their ship was not seaworthy. The court instructed the jury "that the de-
fendants ought not to be found guilty, if they acted bona fide upon reasonable grounds of
belief that the ship was unseaworthy." United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873, 874
(C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14,470) (emphasis added).
38 See, e.g., The Diana, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 354, 360 (1869) ("[t]he case.., must be one
of absolute and uncontrollable necessity"); State v. Wootton, Crim. No. 2685 (Cochise
County, Arizona, Sept. 13, 1919) (reprinted in Comment, The Law of Necessity as Applied in
the Bisbee Deportation Case, 3 ARM. L. REv. 264, 272 (1961)) ("The cases are and must be
rare and the conditions exceptional in which such a rule may be invoked.").
39 United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 366 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383).
40 Note, Criminal Trespass in an Abortion Clinic, supra note 7, at 515.
41 Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 133 (1851).
42 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 6, § 50, at 386.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 As one commentator has pointed out, in most cases, a defendant who believes that
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lated by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Simpson,46 where the
court rejected the necessity defense of a defendant who burned
draft records to protest the Vietnam War. The court stated, "[a]n
essential element of the so-called [necessity] defense is that a direct
causal relationship be reasonably anticipated to exist between the
defender's [sic] action and the avoidance of harm."47 This "causal
relationship" requirement advances the necessity defense's policy
goal of promoting society's welfare by encouraging people actively
to avoid significant dangers. Without a causal relationship between
the criminal offense and avoidance of the threatened harm, the ne-
cessity defense is inappropriate, for "[i]f the criminal act cannot
abate the threatened harm, society receives no benefit from the
criminal conduct."
48
3. Absence of Alternative, Non-Criminal Means to Avoid the Threatened
Harm
Even if a defendant committed a criminal offense with a reason-
able belief that the offense was necessary and designed to avoid a
significant harm, the defendant may not raise a necessity defense if
he or she had some alternative, legal way of avoiding the threat. A
"case does not become 'a case of necessity,' unless all ordinary
means of self-preservation have been exhausted. ' 49 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court unequivocally has concluded that the necessity
defense will fail "if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to vio-
lating the law, 'a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and
his or her action is necessary to avert a harm will also believe that his or her action is
effectively designed to avert that harm. Note, Applying the Necessity Defense, supra note 21,
at 102.
46 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972).
47 Id. at 518.
48 United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1164 (5th Cir. 1982). In Gant, the court
rejected the defendant's claim that his possession of a pistol, in violation of a statute
prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms, was necessary to protect himself
and his property from a perceived robbery threat. Id. at 1162. The court found that the
defendant had failed to meet the "causal relationship" requirement because his posses-
sion of a firearm could not "be reasonably anticipated to abate the threat of death or
serious bodily injury created by the presumed robbery attempt." Id. at 1165.
Another application of the "causal relationship" requirement appears in People v.
Stephens, in which a prison escapee attempted to raise a necessity defense by claiming
that he escaped to protect his wife and children from a third party's violent threats. The
court denied the defendant's necessity defense because he failed to show how his escape
reasonably could be expected to protect his family from harm. 103 Mich. App. 640, 644,
303 N.W.2d 51, 53 (1981).
49 United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 366 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383)
(excerpt from jury instructions in a case involving a ship's crewman who ordered some




also to avoid the threatened harm.' "50
Some courts and commentators suggest that the common law
necessity defense is only available in cases where the threatened
harm was "imminent" or "immediate" at the time the defendant
committed his or her offense. 51 In general, however, a requirement
that the threatened harm must have been imminent is identical to a
requirement that the defendant must have had no alternative, legal
means to avoid the threatened harm. In most cases, until the
threatened harm is imminent, there are legal options for avoiding
it. 5 2
4. Absence of Fault in Bringing About the Choice of Evils Situation
A court may deny the necessity defense to a defendant who was
at fault in creating the situation calling for a choice of evils. For
example, one court has held that an intoxicated person who drove
himself to secure medical care after sustaining a head injury could
not raise a necessity defense to a driving-while-intoxicated charge.
53
In another case, a defendant who violated a statute by driving a
snowmobile on the shoulder of a highway was precluded from rais-
ing a necessity defense based on the fact that the traffic was impassi-
ble. The court found that the defendant had caused the situation
himself by not choosing an alternative travel route.54
5. Harm Sought to Be Avoided Is Greater than the Harm Reasonably
Expected to Result from the Actor's Conduct
Unlike the first four elements of the common law necessity de-
fense, which involve factual determinations, the fifth element of the
defense involves a valuejudgment. A defendant who raises a neces-
sity defense must show that he or she made the proper choice be-
50 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (quoting W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
supra note 6, § 50, at 379). See also People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 831, 118
Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (1974) (a prison escapee may not raise a necessity defense unless he
shows that he did not have the time or opportunity to complain to prison authorities
about threats from other inmates or to seek court protection).
51 See, e.g., G. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, § 232, at 729.
52 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 6, § 50, at 388. See also Holmes, 26 F. Gas. at 366
("The peril must be instant, overwhelming, leaving no alternative.") (emphasis added).
Some courts and commentators also use an "imminence" requirement as a surro-
gate for the requirement that a harm giving rise to a necessity defense must be clear and
certain. Levitin, Putting the Government on Trial. The Necessity Defense and Social Change, 33
WAYNE L. REv. 1221, 1225 (1987) [hereinafter Levitin]. See also Mitchell v. Harmony, 54
U.S. (13 How.) 115, 133 (1851) ("the danger must be immediate and impelling, and not
remote or contingent").
53 Butterfield v. State, 167 Tex. Grim. 64, 317 S.W.2d 943 (1958).
54 State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 183 N.W.2d 541 (1971).
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tween the two "evils" he or she faced. Accordingly, the defendant
must show that the harm he or she sought to avoid by committing a
criminal offense is greater than the harm sought to be avoided by
the statute defining the offense. 55
In considering a defendant's necessity claim, a court views the
facts of a case through the defendant's eyes. A defendant's reason-
able but mistaken belief is sufficient to satisfy many of the factual
elements of necessity.56 In contrast, a defendant's belief, reason-
able or otherwise, that he or she made the proper value choice is not
enough to establish this fifth necessity element.5 7 A defendant's sin-
cere good motive for committing a criminal offense will not support
a necessity defense if the court determines that the harm which the
defendant sought to avoid is not greater than the harm sought to be
avoided by the statute defining the offense.58
Thus, the court independently weighs the relative harmfulness
of the two "evils" which the defendant faced.59 Because the under-
lying purpose of the necessity defense is to achieve social benefits,
the court must use shared societal values as the standard for evaluat-
ing a defendant's choice of harms.60 In determining whether the
defendant's value choice was correct, the court examines "whether,
on a social view, the value assisted was greater than the value
defeated." 61
6. Absence of a Legislative Pre-determination of Values
A defendant may not raise a common law necessity defense if
the legislature has preempted the defense through a pre-determina-
55 The purpose of the necessity defense is to allow people to avoid significant harms
by bringing about lesser harms. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
56 See supra notes 37, 44 and accompanying text.
57 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 6, § 50, at 386.
58 G. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, § 239, at 746.
59 Id.
60 Note, Applying the Necessity Defense, supra note 21, at 84.
61 G. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, § 239, at 746 (emphasis added). The classic English
necessity case, The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, is a case in which the propriety of the
defendants' value choice was at issue. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). The defendants, along
with one other man and a cabin boy, escaped a shipwreck in an open boat. After 18 days
without food, the men killed the boy, who by this time was sick and weak, and fed on his
body. Four days later, the men were rescued, and the defendants were charged with
murder. Id. at 274. The defendants may well have sincerely and reasonably believed
that the death of the sickly cabin boy was a lesser harm than the death of the other three
men. Nevertheless, the court rejected the defendants' claim of necessity, ruling that
under the law of a civilized society, it is never permissible for a person to take an inno-
cent life to save his own. Id. at 286-88. Cf. United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Gas. 360
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (court stated in its jury instruction that, absent a pre-existing duty, a
person is not bound to save another person's life by sacraficing his or her own).
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tion of values. Preemption occurs when the legislature already has
made a choice between the competing values confronting the ac-
tor.62 For example, suppose that a doctor performs a therapeutic
abortion in order to save a mother's life, and is subsequently
charged with murder for violating the jurisdiction's criminal abor-
tion statute. If the abortion statute explicitly criminalizes all abor-
tions, even those performed to save a mother's life, then the doctor
is legislatively preempted from raising a necessity defense. The leg-
islature has made a choice of values between the mother and the
fetus which the court cannot overrule.63 If, however, the statute
does not address the criminality of abortions performed to save a
mother's life, then there is no legislative preemption on the issue of
therapeutic abortion. The court, in analyzing the doctor's necessity
defense, may make its own determination of whether the value of
the mother's life was greater than the value of the aborted fetus. 6
4
The legislative determination of values need not be explicit. A
statute defining a criminal offense may contain an exhaustive list of
the situations in which a person committing the prohibited conduct
will not be held criminally liable. A court appropriately may con-
clude that the legislature intended this list to be a complete enumer-
ation of allowable exceptions to the criminal statute; therefore, the
court may deny the necessity defense to anyone charged with violat-
ing the statute.6
5
C. STATUTORY NECESSITY PROVISIONS
1. Model Penal Code
The necessity defense has been codified as the "Choice of
Evils" defense in the Model Penal Code ("MPC") section 3.02.66
62 W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 6, § 50, at 382.
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., Rex v. Bourne, 1 K.B. 687 (1939) (cited in W. LAFAVE & A. Scotrr, supra
note 6, § 50, at 382 n.5).
65 P. ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 124(d), at 54. See also Bice v. State, 109 Ga. 117, 34
SE. 202 (1899) (court rejected a defendant's use of the necessity defense upon a finding
that the statute, which prohibited the possession of alcohol near a church, explicitly
provided only one exception-for doctors. The defendant was not a doctor. The court
concluded, "[T]he statute itself fixes the exceptions to the operation of the law. To
these we cannot make any additions.").
66 Justification Generally: Choice of Evils
(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to him-
self or to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or
defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise
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This codification encompasses most of the elements of the common
law necessity defense. Under the MPC formulation, for example,
the defendant must have believed that his or her conduct was neces-
sary and conducive to avoiding an evil. 67 The MPC does not restrict
the type of evil which may give rise to a necessity defense or the type
of criminal offense which may be justified.68 Just as at common law,
the balancing of evils under the MPC is not committed to the de-
fendant's private judgment, but is an issue for determination at
trial.69 Furthermore, the legislative preemption doctrine expressed
in the common law is codified in subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c) of the
MPC necessity formulation.7
0
Unlike some common law necessity cases, the MPC does not
categorically deny the necessity defense to defendants who are at
fault in creating the choice of evils situation. 7' Subsection (2), how-
ever, provides that for offenses for which recklessness or negligence
is sufficient to establish culpability, a defendant to whom the neces-
sity defense would otherwise be available may be held criminally lia-
ble if he or she acted recklessly or negligently in bringing about the
situation requiring the choice of evils or in evaluating the necessity
for his or her conduct. The purpose of this provision is to match a
defendant's degree of culpability with the level of culpability re-
quired by the statute defining the charged offense. In addition, the
MPC formulation does not require the defendant to have acted to
avoid an "imminent" harm. The Code drafters believed that an im-
minence requirement would be unnecessarily restrictive.7 2
2. Missouri's Necessity Statute
The Missouri necessity statute, 73 under which the O'Brien case
plainly appear.
(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requir-
ing a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the
justification afforded by this Section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense
for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish
culpability.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985).
67 Id. § 3.02 comment 2, at 11-12.
68 Id. at 14.
69 Id at 12.
70 Id. at 13.
71 See supra Section I.B.4.
72 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 comment 2, at 17. The drafters noted, however, that in
most valid necessity cases, the threatened harm will have been imminent because "genu-
ine necessity rests on the unavailability of alternatives that would avoid both evils, and
... typically when the evil is not imminent some such alternative will be available." Id.
73 The Missouri statute reads in part:
Justification generally.
1. Unless inconsistent with other provisions of this chapter definingjustifiable
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was decided, is based on both the MPC and the New York necessity
statutes.74 Missouri's statutory necessity defense applies in limited
situations. 75 The defense may only be raised by a defendant who
committed a misdemeanor or relatively minor felony as an "emer-
gency measure" to avoid an "imminent public or private injury."
'76
In addition, the choice of evils situation must have arisen through
no fault of the defendant. 77
Furthermore, the Missouri necessity statute provides that a de-
fendant may not justify his or her conduct on the basis of the "im-
morality" of the statute he or she is charged with violating. 78 This
use of physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct which would
otherwise constitute any crime other than a class A felony or murder is justifiable
and not criminal when it is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an immi-
nent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occa-
sioned or developed through no fault of the actor, and which is of such gravity that,
according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability of
avoiding the injury outweighs the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be
prevented by the statute defining the crime charged.
2. The necessity and justifiability of conduct under subsection 1 may not rest
upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute,
either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class
of cases arising thereunder. Whenever evidence relating to the defense ofjustifica-
tion under this section is offered, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the
claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a justification.
3. The defense ofjustification under this section is an affirmative defense.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.026 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
74 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.026 comment to 1973 Proposed Code. The New York ne-
cessity statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05(2) (McKinney 1987), has served as a legislative
model for numerous state necessity laws. It is stricter than the MPC, in several ways.
First, New York imposes an "immenence" requirement, which requires the defendant's
commission of a criminal offense to have been "an emergency measure to avoid imminent
injury," id. (emphasis added); second, the harm to be avoided must "clearly outweigh"
the harm at which the statute defining the defendant's offense is directed, id.; third, the
statute completely withholds the defense from a defendant who was at fault in bringing
about the situation requiring the choice of evils, id.; and finally, fourth, the statute con-
tains a requirement not found in the MPG, namely that the "necessity and justifiability of
such conduct may not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and ad-
visability of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application
to a particular class of cases arising thereunder." Id.
For a more complete discussion of statutory codifications of the necessity defense,
see Note,Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on Statutory Reform, 75 CoLuM. L.
REv. 914 (1975) [hereinafter NoteJustification]; Tiffany & Anderson, Legislating the Neces-
sity Defense in Criminal Law, 52 DEN. U.L. REv. 839 (1975) [hereinafter Tiffany &
Anderson].
75 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.026 comment to 1973 Proposed Code ("The section is
designed to cover unusual situations .... The phraseology of the section... is designed
closely to limit its application and to preclude extension beyond the narrow scope
intended.").
76 Mo. ANN STAT. § 563.026 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
77 Id.
78 Id. comment to 1973 Proposed Code. In this manner, the Missouri statute paral-
lels that of its New York counterpart. Recall that the New York statute provides that the
"necessity and justifiability of such conduct may not rest upon considerations pertaining
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provision makes the necessity defense unavailable to "the crusader
who considers ,a penal statute unsalutory because it tends to ob-
struct his cause."'7
9
D. LEGAL EFFECT OF THE NECESSITY DEFENSE
8 0
Necessity is classified as a "justification" defense.8 1 Under the
theory ofjustification, a defendant concedes that his or her conduct
met the literal requirements of a criminal offense, but claims that his
or her conduct was not criminal because it was socially beneficial.8 2
When a defendant successfully raises a justification defense, his or
her nominally criminal conduct becomes lawful.
8 3
There are several corollaries to the fact that necessity is ajustifi-
cation defense. First, because a successfully-raised necessity de-
fense establishes the defendant's conduct as both lawful and socially
beneficial, all other actors who are faced with the same circum-
stances faced by the defendant are justified in engaging in the same
only to the morality and advisability of the statute ...." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05(2)
(McKinney 1987). Provisions of this type are intended to withhold the necessity defense
from a defendant who commits an act of civil disobedience, intentionally violating a
criminal statute because of a belief that the statute is unjust or a belief that it should not
be applied to him or her. State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685, 687-88 (Me. 1987); Tiffany
& Anderson, supra note 74, at 843-44; Note, Criminal Trepass in an Abortion Clinic, supra
note 7, at 510.
79 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.026 (comment to 1973 Proposed Code). In 1985, a Mis-
souri legislator attempted to limit this "crusader exception" to the Missouri necessity
statute. The legislator proposed an amendment to the necessity statute which would
have explicitly authorized the use of the necessity defense by abortion clinic protesters.
L.A. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, § 1 at 27, col. 1. The bill died in committee. Index, Journals
of the Senate and House of the State of Missouri at 75 (1985).
80 For a philosophical approach to the legal effect of the necessity defense, see Note,
'Yustified" Nuclear and Abortion Clinic Protest. A Kantian Theory ofJurisprudence, 21 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 725 (1985-86).
81 See P. RoBINSON, supra note 19, § 124(a); W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 6,
§ 50, at 381; Arnolds & Garland, supra note 21, at 289-90; United States v. Lopez, 662 F.
Supp. 1083, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1987). In fact, courts sometimes refer to the necessity
defense as the defense of "justification." See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 509 Pa.
118, 126 n.5, 501 A.2d 226, 230 n.5 (1985). But see Comment, Necessity Defined- A New
Role in the Criminal Justice System, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 409, 415-16 (1981) [hereinafter
Comment, Necessity Defined] (arguing that necessity properly should be classified as
neither a justification nor an excuse, but as a separate and distinct defense).
82 See Comment, Necessity Defined, supra note 81, at 413.
83 Lopez, 662 F. Supp. at 1086. Justification defenses are distinct from defenses las-
sified as "excuses." Under the theory of excuse, a defendant admits that his or her
conduct was wrongful and social undesirable, but claims that he or she should not be
held accountable for his or her actions for some reason, such as mental incapacity. Id. at
413-14. Excuse focuses on the blameworthiness of the actor, while justification focuses
on the desirability of the actor's conduct. Id. at 414. The difference between justifica-
tion and excuse is the difference between being right and being forgivably wrong.
Arolds & Garland, supra note 21, at 290.
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conduct.8 4 Second, because conduct justified by necessity is consid-
ered lawful, third persons are entitled to assist in it without incur-
ring criminal liability.85 Finally, third parties have no right to resist
justified conduct.
86
III. THE NECESSITY DEFENSE IN POLITICAL PROTEST CASES
Anti-abortion protesters are not the first group of activists that
has attempted to raise a necessity defense to criminal charges aris-
ing from protest demonstrations. The necessity defense has been
used by such groups as Vietnam War protesters, 87 anti-nuclear
power activists,8 8 and nuclear weapons protesters.8 9 Despite the
widespread use of the necessity defense by political protesters, only
two appellate cases have held that such protesters could present the
defense to the jury; both cases were reversed on appeal to the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court.90 Thus, state and federal appellate courts
84 p. ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 121(c), at 8. See also G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW § 10.1.1, at 761-62 (1978) [hereinafter G. FLETCHER] ("Claims ofjustifi-
cation lend themselves to universalization. That the doing is objectively right (or at least
not wrongful) means that anyone is licensed to do it.").
85 United States v. Lopez, 662 F. Supp. 1083, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1987); G. FLETCHER,
supra note 84, § 10.1.1, at 762; P. ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 12 1(d).
86 G. FLETCHER, Supra note 84, § 10.1.2 at 762; P. ROBINSON, SUpra note 19, § 121(d).
87 See, e.g., United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972); State v. Marley, 54 Haw. 450, 509 P.2d 1095
(1973).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1147 (1983); State v. Levering, 661 S.W.2d 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); People v.
Hubbard, 115 Mich. App. 73, 320 N.W.2d 294 (1982); State v. Greene, 5 Kan. App. 2d
698, 623 P.2d 933 (1981); and Commonwealth v. Averill, 12 Mass. App. 260, 423 N.E.2d
6 (1981).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brodhead, 714 F. Supp. 593 (D.
Mass. 1989); State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685 (Me. 1987); State v. Diener, 706 S.W.2d
582 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); and State v. Champa, 494 A.2d 102 (R.I. 1985).
The necessity defense also has been used by protesters of United States policy in
Central America, State v. Drummy, 18 Conn. App. 303, 557 A.2d 574 (Conn. App. Ct.
1989), anti-apartheid demonstrators, City of Chicago v. Streeter, No. 85-108644 (Cook
Cty. Ill., May 1985) (cited in Comment, Political Protest and the Illinois Defense of Necessity, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1070 & n.2 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Political Protest]), and advo-
cates of increased funding for AIDS research. People v. Alderson, 144 Misc. 2d 133,
540 N.Y.S.2d 948 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1989).
90 Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 325 Pa. Super. 242, 472 A.2d 1099 (1984), rev'd, 509
Pa. 118, 501 A.2d 226 (1985); Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 324 Pa. Super. 61,471 A.2d
462 (1984), rev'd, 508 Pa. 372, 498 A.2d 806 (1985).
Several trial courts have permitted political protesters to raise a necessity defense.
For a discussion of some of these trial court decisions, as well as arguments in favor of
allowing the necessity defense in political protest cases, see Note, Applying the Necessity
Defense, supra note 21; Levitin, supra note 52; Comment, Civil Disobedience as the Lesser Evil,
59 U. COLO. L. REV. 961 (1988); Aldridge & Stark, Nuclear War, Citizen Intervention, and the
Necessity Defense, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299 (1986). Other articles on the use of the
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are unanimous in their view that the necessity defense is unavaila-
ble, as a matter of law, to political activists who commit criminal
offenses in the course of their protests and demonstrations.
Courts which have refused to allow political protesters to raise a
claim of necessity have done so by strictly and narrowly applying the
elements of the necessity defense. These courts have focused par-
ticularly on (1) the nature of the harm to be avoided; (2) the neces-
sity of the defendant's actions; (3) the availability of legal
alternatives; and (4) the presence of a legislative determination of
values. In addition, the courts have relied heavily on public policy
considerations to support their narrow interpretations of the neces-
sity defense.
A. APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENTS OF NECESSITY IN POLITICAL
PROTEST CASES
Many of the courts which have denied the necessity defense to
political protesters have asserted that the harms which the protes-
ters sought to avoid were too speculative and uncertain to support
the defense. These courts have implicitly adopted the Supreme
Court's statement in Mitchell v. Harmony that the threatened harm
giving rise to a choice of evils may not be "remote or contingent.
9'1
Thus, in most cases, courts have found that political protesters are
precluded from raising a necessity defense because they failed to
prove that they faced a clear and certain harm.9 2
Another ground on which courts have denied the use of the ne-
necessity defense in political protest cases include Lippman, Reflections on Non-Violent
Resistance and the Necessity Defense, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 277 (1989); Bauer & Eckerstrom,
The State Made Me Do It: Applicability of the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 1173 (1987) [hereinafter Bauer & Eckerstrom]; Comment, Political Protest, supra
note 89.
91 Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 133 (1851). The adoption of lan-
guage from Mitchell has not been explicit; none of the courts has cited Mitchell on this
point.
Courts have expressed the Mitchell requirement of a clear and certain harm in nu-
merous ways. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 13 Mass. App. 373, 379, 433
N.E.2d 457, 461 (1982) (defendant must have "faced... a clear and imminent danger,
not one which is debatable or speculative); Commonwealth v. Averill, 12 Mass. App.
260, 262,423 N.E.2d 6, 8 (1985) (necessity only available if defendant faced an "obvious
and generally recognized harm"); Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 508 Pa. 372, 378, 498
A.2d 806, 809 (1985) (harm must be "readily apparent and recognizable to reasonable
persons"); and State v. Greene, 5 Kan. App. 2d 698, 701, 623 P.2d 933, 937 (1981)
(citing State v. Warshow, 138 Vt. 22, 25, 410 A.2d 1000, 1000 (1979)) (harm must be
"reasonably certain to occur").
92 But see Brugmann, 13 Mass. App. at 379, 433 N.E.2d at 462 (court found that de-
fendants had presented enough evidence to establish that the threatened harm was not




cessity defense to political protesters is the protesters' failure to
demonstrate a causal relationship between their actions and avoid-
ance of the threatened harm. If a defendant reasonably could not
have expected his or her criminal actions to prevent or diminish the
perceived greater harm, then the defendant cannot argue that those
actions were "necessary" to avoid that harm. 93 Some courts have
applied the causal relationship requirement very strictly, holding
that a defendant cannot claim necessity unless he or she could rea-
sonably have expected his or her actions to completely eliminate the
threatened harm. 94 Other courts have been more liberal, sug-
gesting that a defendant need only demonstrate a reasonable belief
that his or her conduct would reduce the risk posed by the
threatened harm. 95 Under either standard, however, courts have re-
jected the notion that a person can reasonably expect to eliminate
or lessen the "evils" of nuclear war, nuclear power, apartheid, or
human rights violations in Central America by staging an illegal
demonstration.
A third rationale which courts frequently use in denying the ne-
cessity defense to political protesters is the availability of legal alter-
natives. Several courts have noted that protesters need not resort to
illegal tactics in order to publicize their causes or influence public
opinion. Activists are free to participate in the political process, to
make use of the electronic and print media, and to distribute litera-
ture and make speeches in public places. 96 Courts have been un-
93 See supra section II.B.2. See also Capitolo, 508 Pa. at 379, 498 A.2d at 809.
94 Levitin, supra note 52, at 1235. See, e.g., United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270,
1273 (10th Cir. 1982) (defendants must show that a reasonable person would think that
defendants' actions "would terminate the official policy of the United States government
as to nuclear weapons or nuclear power"); State v. Marley, 54 Haw. 450, 472, 509 P.2d
1095, 1109 (1973) (defendants did not show that their conduct was "reasonably
designed to actually prevent the threatened greater harm") (emphasis added); and Com-
monwealth v. Averill, 12 Mass. App. 260, 262, 423 N.E.2d 6, 7-8 (1981) (defendants'
conduct "could not extinguish an immediate peril, if there was one").
95 Levitin, supra note 52, at 1235 n.63. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d
515, 518 (9th Cir. 1972) (it was unreasonable for defendant to believe that his actions
might "have any significant effect upon the supposed ills that he hoped to remedy");
State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685, 688 (Me. 1987) ("there is no reason to believe that the
Defendants' [sic] acts would lessen the threat of harm") (emphasis added); People v. Hub-
bard, 115 Mich. App. 73, 80, 320 N.W.2d 294, 298 (1982) (defendants' actions "could
not reasonably be presumed to have any effect in halting the production of nuclear
power") (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 509 Pa. 118, 123, 501 A.2d 226,
229 (1985) (defendant reasonably must have believed that their actions "would be effec-
tive in avoiding or alleviating the impending harm") (emphasis added); Commonwealth
v. Capitolo, 508 Pa. 372, 379, 498 A.2d 806, 809 (1985) (defendants' conduct could
have "neither terminated nor reduced the alleged danger") (emphasis added).
96 United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 432 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Brod-
head, 714 F. Supp. 593, 597 (D. Mass. 1989); Commonwealth v. Hood, 389 Mass. 581,
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sympathetic to the argument that legal protests are inadequate or
ineffective. 97 Courts also have denied the necessity defense to
protesters who sought to convince government officials or govern-
ment bodies to take specific remedial actions because these protes-
tors also have the option of pursuing their complaints through legal
channels.98
Finally, several courts have held that activists who protest gov-
ernment policies or governmentally-sanctioned activities are legisla-
tively preempted from raising a necessity defense to criminal
charges arising from their protests. These courts have given a lib-
eral interpretation to the traditional legislative preemption element
of the necessity defense. 99 These courts have found that legislatures
can preclude political protesters from raising a necessity defense by
making broad legislative choices in favor of particular policies or
activities. They argue that by enacting a policy or sanctioning an
activity, a legislature makes a value choice which courts may not re-
consider through application of the necessity defense. 100
For example, in some nuclear power protest cases, courts have
asserted that in passing legislation encouraging and regulating nu-
clear power, state legislatures and Congress have exhaustively de-
bated the merits and dangers of nuclear power and have made a
value choice in favor of nuclear energy. The legislatures therefore
implicitly have precluded the use of the necessity defense in nuclear
power protest cases.' 0 '
593, 452 N.E.2d 188, 196 (1983); State v. Diener, 706 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986).
97 See, e.g., Seward, 687 F.2d at 1275; Brodhead, 714 F. Supp. at 597.
98 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 13 Mass. App. 373, 380-381, 433 N.E.2d
457, 462-63 (1982) (protesters charged with trespass for occupying a restricted area of a
nuclear power plant presented strong evidence of actual radiation leaks at the plant;
court nevertheless rejected defendants' necessity claim because defendants had not at-
tempted to abate the hazard by initiating court actions on behalf of the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission or its state counterpart). See also People v. Alderson, 144 Misc. 2d 133,
144, 540 N.Y.S.2d 948, 955-56 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1989) (necessity defense denied to
demonstrators protesting reduction in AIDS funding in part because court found that
protesters could have lobbied legislators or arranged a meeting with the health depart-
ment's counsel).
99 For a more detailed discussion of legislative preemption, see supra section II.B.6.
100 For criticisms of this liberal interpretation of legislative preemption, see Levitin,
supra note 52, at 1237-38; Note, Applying the Necessity Defense, supra note 21, at 107-110.
101 See Commonwealth v. Averill, 12 Mass. App. 260, 263, 423 N.E.2d 6, 8 (1985) (the
necessity defense does not apply to harms which are "the subject of legislation and gov-
ernment regulation."); People v. Hubbard, 115 Mich. App. 73, 79, 320 N.W.2d 294, 297
(1982) ("the necessity defense is unavailable in an area where there has been exhaustive




In effect, the necessity defense allows individuals to make pri-
vate legal determinations in accordance with their personal convic-
tions.' 0 2 Fearing that widespread use of the defense will result in
"ad hoc self help which forebodes legal chaos,"' 03 courts under-
standably have been hesitant to extend the application of the neces-
sity defense to political protest cases.' 04 The fact that necessity is a
justification defense, and therefore lends itself to universaliza-
tion,' 0 5 contributes to judicial reluctance to apply the defense
widely. 10 6 Thus, several courts have stated flatly that the necessity
defense may not be used by people who commit criminal offenses to
show their disagreement with government policies.'
0 7
Another policy concern expressed by courts is the fear that ac-
ceptance of a political necessity defense would subvert the demo-
cratic process by transferring important political questions from a
legislative or executive forum to a judicial forum.' 08 In fact, polit-
ical protesters often make claims of necessity so that they will have
an opportunity to discuss political issues in court and "educate" the
App. 1986) (necessity defense denied to anti-nuclear weapons activists because Con-
gress' national defense policies represent affirmative and conclusive value choices).
A more expansive interpretation of what constitutes a legislative choice of values is
found in Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 509 Pa. 118, 501 A.2d 226 (1985). In Berrigan, the
necessity defense was denied to trespassers at a plant manufacturing nuclear warheads
because the harm sought to be avoided was a legal activity. "[S]ince the manufacture of
shell casings for nuclear warheads is legal conduct ... it is the type of conduct to which
the Legislature has spoken in excluding the justification defense .... [T]he justification
defense is aimed at stopping perceived illegal conduct, not legal conduct." Id. at 126 n.5,
501 A.2d at 230 n.5 (emphasis in original).
The issue of whether a legal activity can ever constitute a "harm" giving rise to a
necessity defense is controversial and has played an important role in the question of
whether the necessity defense is available to abortion clinic protesters. See infra notes
141-147 and accompanying text.
102 Comment, Political Protest, supra note 89, at 1087-88.
1O Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 508 Pa. 372, 381, 498 A.2d 806, 810 (1985).
104 See also Hubbard, 115 Mich. App. at 79, 320 N.W.2d at 297 (the necessity defense
"cannot permit an individual to substitute his own convictions for those of a reasoned
and democratic decision-making process"); People v. Alderson, 144 Misc. 2d 133, 144,
540 N.Y.S.2d 948, 956 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1989) ("One's moral convictions alone can
never be the basis for a justification defense.").
105 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
106 See United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 433 (9th Cir. 1985) (acceptance of de-
fendant's necessity defense "would amount to recognizing that an individual may assert
a defense to criminal charges whenever he or she disagrees with a result reached by the
political process.").
107 Dorrell, 758 F.2d at 432; United States v. Brodhead, 714 F. Supp. 593, 597 (D.
Mass. 1989); State v. Diener, 706 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Alderson, 144
Misc. 2d at 143, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
108 Hubbard, 115 Mich. App. at 79, 320 N.W.2d at 297.
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jury about perceived social harms.10 9 The courts have held, there-
fore, that a protester may not use the courtroom as "a platform
from which one may expound his opinions upon political issues."' 10
IV. APPLICATION OF THE NECESsrrY DEFENSE TO ABORTION CLINIC
PROTESTS
Like other political activists, abortion clinic protesters have
been uniformly unsuccessful at the appellate level in raising the ne-
cessity defense to criminal charges arising from their demonstra-
tions and protests."' In denying the defense to abortion clinic
trespassers, many courts have employed the same analysis used in
cases involving other political protesters. 12 Although not all of the
arguments used to deny the necessity defense to general political
protesters apply with equal force to anti-abortion activists, abortion
clinic protesters clearly are precluded from raising a necessity de-
fense under the political protest analysis. The most powerful argu-
ments against allowing abortion clinic trespassers to raise the
necessity defense, however, stem from factors which are more
closely associated with the abortion clinic protest context: the ab-
sence of social consensus on the abortion issue; the current legal
status of fetuses; and the constitutional protection which the
Supreme Court has granted to abortion rights.
109 Comment, Political Protest, supra note 89, at 1090; Levitin, supra note 52, at 1225;
Bauer & Eckstrom, supra note 90, at 1176.
110 Diener, 706 S.W.2d at 585.
111 See Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981); Bird v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 787 P.2d 119 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); Pursley v. State, 21
Ark. App. 107, 730 S.W.2d 250 (1987); Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291 (D.C.
App. 1979); People v. Smith, 161 Ill. App. 3d 213, 514 N.E.2d 211 (1987), appeal denied,
118 Ill. 2d 550, 520 N.E.2d 391 (1988); People v. Krizka, 92 Ill. App. 3d 288,416 N.E.2d
36 (1981); People v. Stiso, 93 Ill. App. 3d 101, 416 N.E.2d 1209 (1981); Sigma Repro-
ductive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 467 A.2d 483 (1983); State v. O'Brien, 784
S.W.2d 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); City of St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982); State v. Clowes, 100 Or. App. 266, 785 P.2d 1071 (1990); Commonwealth
v. Markum, 373 Pa. Super. 341, 541 A.2d 347 (1988), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 615, 554
A.2d 507 (1988); cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1533 (1989); Commonwealth v. Wall, 372 Pa.
Super. 534, 539 A.2d 1325 (1988), appeal denied, 521 Pa. 604, 555 A.2d 114 (1988);
Erlandson v. State, 763 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 152
(1989); Bobo v. State, 757 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2066
(1989); Crabb v. State, 754 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 65
(1989); Hoffart v. State, 686 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 824
(1986); Buckley v. City of Falls Church, 7 Va. App. 32, 371 S.E.2d 827 (1988); State v.
Horn, 126 Wis. 2d 447, 377 N.W.2d 176 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 139 Wis. 2d 473,
407 N.W.2d 854 (1987).
112 See infra section IV.A.
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A. ANTI-ABORTION ACTIVITIES AS POLITICAL PROTESTS
Abortion clinic protesters are similar in many respects to other
political protesters. Like anti-war activists and nuclear power
protesters, most abortion clinics trespassers seek to change govern-
ment policy. In fact, at least one group of anti-abortion activists ex-
plicitly has compared itself to other political protesters who
intentionally break laws in an attempt to change them.113 Abortion
clinic protesters hope that by trespassing at abortion clinics, they
can convince the Supreme Court to overturn Roe v. Wade, which
granted constitutional protection to abortion rights. 114
Thus, opposition to the government's current abortion policy
lies at the root of virtually all abortion clinic demonstrations, even
those demonstrations conducted by individuals who claim to have
only non-political goals. In Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, for
example, the defendants, charged with trespassing at an abortion
clinic, claimed that they were merely intervening to protect the
"human lives" scheduled to be aborted that day. The court never-
theless found that the defendants' actions were more appropriately
characterized as a general protest.11 5
Unlike most political protesters, however, abortion-clinic tres-
passers do have an immediately realizable, non-political goal as well:
they seek to prevent individual abortions, which they view as
murders.1 6 Because abortion clinic protesters have a non-political
113 Washington Post, Feb. 25, 1978, sec. B, at 1 (quoting attorneys for a group of anti-
abortion protesters in Fairfax County, Virginia, after the group had been enjoined from
demonstrating at an abortion clinic. For a more detailed analysis of this event, see infra
notes 209-213 and accompanying text.)
114 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), held that there is a constitutional right of pri-
vacy implicit in the fourteenth amendment which encompasses a woman's right to ob-
tain an abortion. Under Roe, no state can impose any restrictions on a woman's abortion
rights during the first three months of her pregnancy. Id. at 164. In addition, prior to
the time that the fetus becomes "viable," or potentially able to live outside the womb,
the state may only regulate abortion in ways that are "reasonably related to maternal
health." Id.
115 Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1077, 1080 (Alaska 1981).
See also Bird v. Municipality of Anchorage, 787 P.2d 119, 122 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990)
(although trespassers claimed that their only goal was to prevent specific abortions,
court held that "it would be inappropriate to characterize the trespasses as anything
other than a protest"); Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 681,
467 A.2d at 493 (1983) (trespassing to "save the lives of the unborn" held to be a "pro-
test of the activities of the clinic").
116 Comment, The Necessity Defense in Abortion Clinic Trespass Cases, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J.
523, 528 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Abortion Clinic Trespass Cases]. See, e.g., Cleveland,
631 P.2d at 1077; People v. Krizka, 92 Ill. App. 3d 288, 291, 416 N.E.2d 36, 37 (1981);
People v. Stiso, 93 Ill. App. 3d 101, 102, 416 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (1981); Sigma, 297 Md.
at 681, 467 A.2d at 493; City of St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Commonwealth v. Wall, 372 Pa. Super. 534, 540, 539 A.2d 1325, 1328 (1988);
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goal as well as a political goal, some of the arguments used by the
courts to deny the necessity defense to other political protesters are
less applicable in the abortion clinic trespass context. For example,
the alleged "harm" which abortion clinic trespassers seek to avoid
is, in most cases, less speculative and remote than the harms sought
to be avoided by other political protesters. Abortion clinic protes-
ters often can prove that abortions are scheduled to be performed at
a particular clinic on the day of their demonstrations. 1 7 Thus, the
perceived harm which abortion clinic trespassers hope to prevent,
unlike the harms sought to be avoided by many other protesters, is
not "a theoretical future [event] ... that may or may not occur."' 18
Similarly, anti-abortion activists, unlike most other political
protesters, often can establish a causal relationship between their
activities and avoidance of the perceived harm. Admittedly, several
courts have asserted that abortion clinic protesters cannot reason-
ably expect to stop abortions from taking place.1 19 These courts ar-
gue that because of their limited numbers, trespassing
demonstrators only can block access to some abortion clinics, and
only for a limited time; at most, therefore, demonstrators can hope
to postpone some abortions or to force some women to go to other
clinics.120
Many other courts have recognized, however, that in the polit-
ical protest context, a defendant raising a necessity defense need
not demonstrate that his or her actions could have eliminated the
threatened harm. To establish the requisite causal relationship, a
protester need only show that his or her actions reasonably could
have been expected to diminish or abate the threatened harm. 12 1
Abortion clinic protesters can argue that during the course of their
demonstrations, they effectively prevent scheduled abortions from
State v. Horn, 126 Wis. 2d 447, 455, 377 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985), aft'd,
139 Wis. 2d 473, 407 N.W.2d 854 (1987).
Other abortion clinic protesters have asserted a need to inform women of the psy-
chological consequences of abortion, Pursley v. State, 21 Ark. App. 107, 109, 730
S.W.2d 250, 252 (1987); Buckley v. City of Falls Church, 7 Va. App. 32, 371 S.E.2d 827,
828 (1988), or to protect the "health and well-being" of women who are planning to
undergo abortions. Sigma, 297 Md. at 663, 467 A.2d at 484.
117 See, e.g., Krizka, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 289,416 N.E.2d at 36; Klocker, 637 S.W.2d at 175.
118 United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1980) (concerning political
protest at Trident submarine base).
119 Cleveland, 631 P.2d at 1080; Commonwealth v. Markum, 373 Pa. Super. 341, 349,
541 A.2d 347, 350-351 (1988); Wall, 372 Pa. Super. at 542, 539 A.2d at 1329.
120 Cleveland, 631 P.2d at 1080; Markum, 373 Pa. Super. at 349, 541 A.2d at 351; Wall,
372 Pa. Super. at 542, 539 A.2d at 1329.
121 See supra note 95.
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taking place. 122 They thereby abate the "harm" of abortion, albeit
only temporarily.1 23 In addition, at least one group of anti-abortion
activists has offered evidence of women who actually have been dis-
suaded from having abortions by abortion clinic protesters.
1 24
Nevertheless, the other arguments which courts have used in
denying the necessity defense to general political protesters do ap-
ply to abortion clinic protesters as well. Like other political protes-
ters, anti-abortion activists have legal alternatives for airing their
political views and seeking policy changes. Anti-abortion activists
can lobby for legislative reform125 or work for passage of a constitu-
tional amendment restricting abortion rights. As various courts
have noted, abortion opponents can legally express their opposition
to abortion by peacefully demonstrating and distributing leaflets on
public property, 126 by advertising on billboards or in other me-
dia, 127 by canvassing door to door, 128 by making telephone calls,
129
or by sending literature through the mail.130 Abortion opponents
also can advance their non-political goal of dissuading women from
obtaining abortions through legal means, for they can demonstrate
and distribute information to potential clients on public streets
outside abortion clinics.131
Furthermore, the public policy concerns which have prevented
courts from accepting the necessity defense in political protest cases
are equally valid in abortion clinic trespass cases. As several courts
have noted, accepting the necessity defense would permit abortion
opponents to choose which laws to obey or disobey based on their
personal beliefs, which is "tantamount to judicially sanctioning vigi-
122 See, e.g., People v. Krizka, 92 Ill. App. 3d 288, 289, 416 N.E.2d 36 (1980) (protes-
ters physically interposed themselves between women seeking abortions and clinic em-
ployees); People v. Stiso, 93 Ill. App. 3d 101, 416 N.E.2d 1209, 1210 (1981) (protesters
blocked door to abortion clinic's surgery room); Bobo v. State, 757 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988) (defendants chained the doors of an abortion clinic shut to prevent staff
and patients from entering). See also infra notes 187-92 and 209-13 and accompanying
text.
123 See Comment, Abortion Clinic Trespass Cases, supra note 116, at 535 (arguing that the
actions of an abortion clinic trespasser who prevents a woman from obtaining an abor-
tion at a particular clinic on a particular day are valuable, even though the woman may
obtain an abortion at a later time).
124 Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291, 1292 (D.C. App. 1979).
125 See Commonwealth v. Wall, 372 Pa. Super. 534, 542, 539 A.2d 1325, 1329 (1988).
126 Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 689, 467 A.2d 483, 497
(1983); Commonwealth v. Markum, 373 Pa. Super. 341, 349, 541 A.2d 347, 351 (1988);
Wall, 372 Pa. Super. at 542, 539 A.2d at 1329.
127 Buckley v. City of Falls Church, 7 Va. App. 32, 371 S.E.2d 827, 828 (1988).
128 Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1352 (3d Cir. 1989).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Commonwealth v. Wall, 372 Pa. Super. 534, 542, 539 A.2d 1325, 1329 (1988).
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lantism,"' 13 2 and may lead to "a society of strife and chaos." 133 In
addition, allowing the necessity defense in abortion clinic protest
cases would undermine the proper workings of the government.
Abortion opponents should seek to change the legal status of abor-
tion through appropriate legal channels rather than by committing
criminal offenses.'
3 4
Finally, under the liberal legislative-preemption analysis em-
ployed in other political protest cases,135 abortion clinic protesters
are preempted from raising a necessity defense. First, many state
legislatures have weighed the competing values involved in abortion
clinic trespass cases and have achieved a legislative balance, re-
flected in state abortion statutes, l3 6 which cannot be disturbed by
the courts.' 3 7 Several courts have asserted that these regulatory
statutes represent a clear and deliberate legislative choice in favor of




133 Commonwealth v. Markum, 373 Pa. Super. 341, 348, 541 A.2d 347, 350 (1988).
134 People v. Crowley, 142 Misc. 2d 663, 671, 538 N.Y.S.2d 146, 152 (N.Y. Just. Ct.
1989); State v. Horn, 126 Wis. 2d 447, 456, 377 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
135 See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
136 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-9-302; 20-16-
801 through 20-16-808 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-604 through 18-611 (1987);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-58.5-1 through 35-1-58.5-5 (West Supp. 1990); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 311-710 through 311-760 (Michie 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.411-145.416
(West 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 442.240-442.270 (Michie 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-45.1 (1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-730 through 1-741 (West 1984); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-10 through 44-41-80 (Law Co-op 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 34-23A-I through 34-23A-19 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-15-201 through 39-15-
203 (Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-301 through 76-7-305.5 (1990).
137 See Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1081 (Alaska 1981)
("The Alaska legislature is better suited to strike the balance [of values involved in abor-
tion clinic protests] than is this Court.").
138 See id. at 1080-81; City of St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Crowley, 142 Misc. 2d at 671, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 151; Commonwealth v. Markum,
373 Pa. Super. 341, 349, 541 A.2d 347, 350 (1988); Commonwealth v. Wall, 372 Pa.
Super. 534, 543, 539 A.2d 1325, 1329 (1988). This argument is weak, however, because
many state statutes regulating abortion actually reflect a desire on the part of state legis-
latures to restrict abortions as much as possible. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.010
(Vernon Supp. 1989) ("It is the intention of the general assembly of Missouri... to
regulate abortion to the full extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States,
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and federal statutes.") See also ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, 81-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (describing legislature's intention to
return to a policy of permitting only abortions necessary to save the mother's life if Roe
v. Wade is ever overturned or modified or if the Constitution is amended). Also, the
Illinois statutes "regulating" abortion, like many state abortion statutes, are located in
the Criminal Code.
One court has held that a state legislature's repeal of all laws which might inhibit or
restrict a woman's abortion decision represents a legislative value choice in favor of
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Second, even in states where the legislature has not made an
implicit value choice in favor of abortion, abortion clinic protesters
are preempted from raising a necessity defense by the fact that abor-
tion rights are constitutionally protected. 1 3 9 Admittedly, it would be
unreasonable to assert that today's society has uniformly embraced
the Roe Court's value choice. Nonetheless, the constitutional pro-
tection afforded abortion has the legal effect of a declaration of soci-
ety's values concerning abortion, which precludes the use of the
necessity defense by abortion clinic protesters.
1 40
Some courts and commentators have further liberalized the leg-
islative preemption analysis by asserting that legal human conduct
can never be a "harm" which gives rise to a choice of evils defense.
They therefore argue that abortion clinic protesters are precluded
from raising a necessity defense simply because abortion is not ille-
gal.14 1 This argument seems to suggest that a legislature's decision
not to illegalize an activity represents an implicit value choice in
favor of that activity which cannot be circumvented through applica-
tion of the necessity defense.
Abortion opponents vigorously have challenged the notion that
legal activities can never be considered necessity-triggering
harms.' 42 Under certain circumstances, one can argue persuasively
abortion which cannot be challenged through application of the necessity defense. State
v. Clowes, 100 Or. App. 266, 272, 785 P.2d 1071, 1074 (1990).
139 See Markum, 373 Pa. Super. at 349, 541 A.2d at 350 ("Were [abortion] not pro-
tected by [regulatory] legislation, the justification defense would continue to remain un-
available because a women's right to abortion is protected by the Constitution of the
United States.").
140 See P. ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 124(d), at 52 ("as long as the law or policies
being protested have been lawfully adopted, they are conclusive evidence of the commu-
nity's view of the issue" and preclude the use of the necessity defense).
141 See, e.g., Note, Criminal Trepass in an Abortion Clinic, supra note 7, at 513; Cleveland v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1078 n.10 (Alaska 1981). These courts and
commentators assume that abortion protests are conducted at clinics which perform
legal abortions. Somejudicial opinions suggest that the necessity defense may be avail-
able to anti-abortion activists who protest the performance of illegal abortions. See Peo-
ple v. Archer, 143 Misc. 2d 390, 537 N.Y.S.2d 726 (N.Y. City Ct. 1988); Markum, 373 Pa.
Super. at 355, 541 A.2d at 354 (Tamilia,J., dissenting); Bobo v. State, 757 S.W.2d 58, 63
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988). But see Comment, Political Protest, supra note 89, at 1084 (arguing
that the necessity defense is unavailable to all political protesters, even those who pro-
test illegal activities, because of public policy considerations and the availability of legal
protest alternatives.).
142 One anti-abortion commentator has cited Professor Robinson's treatise on crimi-
nal law defenses in support of the argument that legal human conduct can support a
necessity defense. Comment, Abortion Clinic Trespass Cases, supra note 116, at 528 (citing
P. ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 124(b), at 48). This commentator misreads Robinson's
treatise, however. Professor Robinson asserts that a human-created "harm" which trig-
gers a necessity defense "need not be unlawful, as long as it is unjustified." P. ROBINSON,
supra note 19, § 124(b), at 48 (emphasis added). The distinction between "unlawful"
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that a legal activity may constitute a "harm to be avoided." The
appellant in O'Brien, for example, suggested that a person who sees
a three-year-old child lighting matches and dropping them into a
gasoline can, and who trespasses in order to take the matches away,
may raise a necessity defense even though the threatened harm is
not unlawful.' 43 The O'Brien court, while not taking a clear position
on the issue, acknowledged the possibility that in some cases, legal
human conduct might support a necessity defense.144
Even if circumstances do exist in which legal human conduct
can constitute a "harm to be avoided," however, abortion clinic
protesters nevertheless are preempted from raising a necessity de-
fense. Abortion is unlike those legal human activities that arguably
give rise to a necessity defense because abortion is not only legal, but
also legally protected.'45 The actions of a child who plays with matches
or a police officer who moves an injured person without a stretcher
are not illegal, but they are not affirmatively protected by law. In
contrast, the "harm" which abortion clinic trespassers seek to avoid
has been granted affirmative legal protection by both state legisla-
tures and the Constitution, as interpreted in Roe. An activity which
has been granted affirmative legal protection, much more than an
activity on which the legislature and Constitution have been silent, is
the product of a legislative value choice which preempts the use of
the necessity defense.146
In addition, the necessity defense's underlying rationale re-
quires that the defense be withheld from abortion clinic protesters,
even if the defense is appropriate in other cases involving legal
human conduct. As one commentator has noted, "[tihe [necessity]
conduct and "unjustified" conduct makes the necessity defense available to a person
who commits a criminal offense in response to a threat from a person who "is not crimi-
nally liable for his threats because of a nonexculpatory defense or a disability that would
qualify him for an excuse." Id. Thus, according to Robinson, lawful human conduct can
support a necessity defense only if the conduct would have been unlawful but for some
defense, such as insanity, which excused the actor from criminal liability. This narrow
exception does not apply to abortion clinic protesters, for abortion's legality is based on
the Constitution, not on the availability of an exculpatory excuse to those who obtain or
perform abortions.
143 Supplemental Brief for Appellant, supra note 14, at 11.
144 O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d at 192 n.5 (citing City of Chicago v. Mayer, 56 Ill. App. 2d
366, 308 N.E.2d 601 (1974) (necessity defense allowed medical student after he pre-
vented police officers from moving injured person without a stretcher)). For another
argument that legal activities may constitute "harms to be avoided," see People v.
Archer, 143 Misc. 2d 390, 398, 537 N.Y.S.2d 726, 730-31 (N.Y. City Ct. 1988) (noting
that prostitution, which is legal in Nevada, may nevertheless qualify as a "harm to be
avoided," for although it is legal, it is not necessarily moral).
145 See People v. Stiso, 93 Ill. App. 3d 101, 104, 416 N.E.2d at 1209, 1212 (1981).
146 See id. at 104, 416 N.E.2d at 1211.
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doctrine was developed to deal with unusual circumstances--ones
never contemplated by the criminal or civil law." 147 Thus, legal
conduct can give rise to a necessity defense only when the harm em-
anating from the conduct was not contemplated or foreseen at the
time the conduct was legalized. Abortion is not an unforeseen or
unanticipated "harm" arising from otherwise legal activity. The
performance of abortions is precisely what the Supreme Court con-
templated when it declared abortion to be constitutionally pro-
tected, and what state legislatures anticipated when they enacted
statutes regulating abortion. Abortion clinic protesters therefore
are precluded from raising a necessity defense.
B. ABORTION CLINIC PROTEST DISTINGUISHED FROM POLITICAL
PROTEST
In addition to the arguments applicable to political protests in
general, independent grounds more closely associated with abortion
clinic protests also exist for denying the necessity defense to abor-
tion clinic trespassers. Abortion, the "harm" sought to be avoided
by anti-abortion activists, differs fundamentally from the harms
sought to be avoided by many other political protesters; there is no
social consensus on the conflicting values involved in abortion clinic
protests, and abortion threatens no legally recognized interest. In
addition, the constitutional protection which the Supreme Court has
granted to first-trimester abortions prevents courts from exculpat-
ing abortion clinic trespassers who attempt to prevent women from
receiving abortions. These factors represent even stronger reasons
for denying the necessity defense to abortion clinic trespassers than
the arguments courts have used to deny the defense to other polit-
ical protesters.
1. Abortion as a "Greater Harm" or a "Harm to Be Avoided"
Abortion clinic trespassers who assert a necessity defense claim
that abortion is a "greater harm" than trespass because abortion is
the killing of an "unborn child." Because there is no social consen-
sus on the abortion issue, however, abortion clinic trespassers can-
not claim that their "balancing of harms" advances collectively
shared values.148 The necessity defense is therefore unavailable to
anti-abortion activists, for "[niecessity is meant to justify action that
147 Note, Criminal Trepass in an Abortion Clinic, supra note 7, at 515. See also supra notes
38-41 and accompanying text.
148 Recall that a defendant raising a necessity defense must have acted to avoid a harm
that society considers "greater" than the harm sought to be avoided by the statute defin-
ing the charged offense. See supra section II.B.5.
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society would clearly want to exonerate."1 49
For example, when a person destroys property to prevent the
spread of a fire or a disease, he or she advances society's belief that
human life is more valuable than property.' 50 Similarly, when an
ambulance on its way to an accident ignores a traffic signal, or a
druggist dispenses medication without a prescription in an emer-
gency, societal interests are advanced. Many political protesters
also can argue that their actions reflect society's values; few people
would disagree that criminal trespass is a lesser harm than cancer-
causing radiation leaks, nuclear meltdown, or nuclear war.' 51 In
contrast, the basic claim of anti-abortion activists, that abortion is
tantamount to murder and is therefore a "greater harm" which jus-
tifies criminal trespass, is not a collectively shared value. It is a
highly controversial and hotly debated issue. Thus, a person who
commits a criminal trespass in order to prevent abortions does not
act in advancement of society's shared interests, and cannot raise a
necessity defense.'
5 2
Beyond the fact that there is no social consensus on the abor-
tion issue, the necessity defense is also unavailable as a matter of law
to abortion clinic protesters because under the Constitution, as cur-
rently interpreted by the Supreme Court, abortion is not a
"harm."' 153 Professor Robinson defines a "harm" in the necessity
context as an unjustified threat to a legally protected interest. 154 He
goes on to define "legally protected interests" as "those interests
that the community is willing to recognize and that are not specifi-
cally denied recognition by the legal system."' 155 Under Roe, first-
trimester abortions, performed in licensed facilities, do not threaten
any legally protected interests.' 56 The Roe Court specifically denied
149 Note, Criminal Trepass in an Abortion Clinic, supra note 30, at 515 (emphasis added).
150 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 6, § 50, at 382.
151 Note, Applying the Necessity Defense, supra note 21, at 107.
152 Id. at 107 n.185 ("[I]f there is no moral consensus in the community, then an actor
cannot claim to be acting upon the basis of shared societal values; in areas of moral
controversy an actor cannot act on behalf of the community. Therefore, the [necessity]
defense should be unavailable in such situations.").
153 Recall that one of the essential elements of the necessity defense is that the de-
fendant acted to avoid a significant harm. See supra section II.B. 1.
154 P. ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 124(b), at 47. See also City of St. Louis v. Kocker,
637 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("a public or private injury... presupposes
the actionable invasion of some right").
155 p. ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 124(b), at 47.
156 The fact that an activity is legal does not necessarily imply that it does not threaten
any legally protected interests. The operation of a licensed nuclear power plant, for
example, is a legal activity; however, its operation could threaten legally protected inter-
ests, though perhaps only remotely. These legally protected interests are the lives,
health, and property of the people living nearby. A power plant's neighbors would have
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recognition to a fetus's right to life, holding that the word "person"
in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn. 157 In
addition, the Court held that the other two interests implicated by
abortion, a state's interest in protecting a pregnant woman's health,
and a state's interest in protecting the potentiality of human life, do
not become legally recognizable until after the first trimester of
pregnancy. ' 5 8 Thus, abortion is not a "harm," and criminal offenses
committed for the purpose of preventing abortions cannot be justi-
fied on necessity grounds. 159
Despite the absence of social consensus on abortion, and the
fact that first-trimester abortions threaten no legally-protected inter-
ests, some anti-abortion activists have suggested that the necessity
defense is available to abortion clinic protesters in Missouri by vir-
tue of the 1986 Missouri abortion statute. 160 These activists argue
that the statute demonstrates the existence of both a social consen-
sus against abortion and a legal recognition of a fetus' right to life in
the state of Missouri. The 1986 abortion act amended the Revised
Statutes of Missouri to read in part, "It is the intention of the gen-
eral assembly of the state of Missouri to grant the right to life to all
humans, born and unborn...." 16 1 More significantly, the act's pre-
amble162 sets forth legislative "findings" that human life begins at
a cause of action for damages resulting from a nuclear accident. Thus, arguing that
abortion is not a necessity-triggering "harm" because it does not threaten any legally
protected interests differs from arguing that abortion is not a necessity-triggering
"harm" simply because it is legal. See supra notes 141-147 and accompanying text. For a
good comparison of these two arguments, see State v. Clowes, 100 Or. App. 266, 785
P.2d 1071 (1990) (Graber, J., specially concurring).
157 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
158 Id. at 162-63.
159 See People v. Krizka, 92 Ill. App. 3d 288, 290, 416 N.E.2d 36, 37 (1980) ("Under
Roe, an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy is not a legally recognizable
injury, and therefore, defendants' trespass was not justified by reason of necessity.").
160 Act approved June 26, 1986, 1986 Mo. LAws 689.
161 The complete statement of legislature intent reads as follows:
Intent of general assembly.
It is the intention of the general assembly of the state of Missouri to grant the
right to life to all humans, born and unborn, and to regulate abortion to the full
extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States, decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, and federal statutes.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.010 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
162 The preamble states:
Life begins at conception-unborn child, defined-failure to provide prenatal care,
no cause of action for
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the
life, health, and well-being of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and con-
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conception and that "unborn children" have protectable interests in
life, health, and well-being. The preamble also requires that all Mis-
souri laws, presumably including the necessity statute, be inter-
preted to acknowledge that "unborn children" possess all the
rights, privileges, and immunities of other persons, to the extent
consistent with the United States Constitution as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court. 163 Although this preamble was
struck down as unconstitutional by the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals,' 4 the Supreme Court, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv-
ices, 16 5  reinstated the lrovision without passing on its
constitutionality.
At least one abortion clinic trespasser has argued that the 1986
abortion act, which demonstrates the Missouri General Assembly's
strong opposition to abortion, reflects the collectively shared values
of the people of Missouri, for "the will of the majority is 'reflected
by the executive and legislative branches of government.' "166 Simi-
larly, Judge George Gerhard, a St. Louis County trial judge who ac-
quitted a group of abortion clinic protesters on necessity grounds,
found that the act's preamble expressed "the sense of the people of
the State of Missouri... that life begins at conception."' 1 67 Thus, in
the wake of the Supreme Court's Webster decision, abortion clinic
protesters in Missouri claimed statutory support for the assertion
that their actions reflected the social consensus of the people of Mis-
souri, and not merely their own personal convictions. 168
In addition, following Webster, Missouri abortion foes could cite
the act's preamble as proof that abortion invades a legally protected
interest and is therefore a harm which can support a necessity de-
strued to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development,
all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and
residents of this state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States, and
decisional interpretations thereof by the United State Supreme Court and specific
provisions to the contrary in the statutes and constitution of this state.
3. As used in this section, the term "unborn children" or "unborn child" shall
include all unborn child or children of the offspring of human beings from the mo-
ment of conception until birth at every stage of biological development.
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action against
a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to properly care for
herself or by failing to follow any particular program of prenatal care.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
163 Id.
164 Reproductive Health Services v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1077 (8th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
165 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
166 Reply Brief for Appellant at 10, State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. Ct. App
1989) (No. 55582) (quoting State v. Diener, 706 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)).
167 Gerhard, supra note 17, at 2-3.
168 Supplemental Brief for Appellant, supra note 14, at 6.
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fense. The appellant in O'Brien, for example, asserted that, "[i]n
Missouri, under the current state of the law, an unborn child is rec-
ognized to be a human being, worthy of legal protection."1 69 Judge
Gerhard, after noting that "abortion kills an unborn child,"' 170 de-
clared "[t]he law of the state of Missouri... is, that an unborn child
is a person entitled to all the rights (as, for instance, against being
killed) owed to and possessed by a born child."' 171 In short, many
anti-abortion activists argue that by reinstating the preamble to Mis-
souri's 1986 abortion act, Webster opened the door for Missouri
abortion clinic protesters to raise a necessity defense.
172
This argument, however, is based on an incomplete reading of
both the Webster decision and current Missouri law. In Webster, the
Supreme Court did not expressly approve the Missouri abortion
act's preamble or endorse any particular interpretation of the pre-
amble's meaning. 173 Instead, the Court stated that it could not rule
on the preamble's meaning or constitutional validity because the
Court was " '[1]acking any authoritative construction of the statute
by the state courts ... and [was faced] with a record which presents
no concrete set of facts to which the statute is to be applied.' ",174
The Supreme Court left the task of interpreting the preamble to the
Missouri state courts. The Court noted, however, that "the pream-
ble does not by its terms regulate abortion," and suggested that the
preamble could be interpreted to do nothing more than extend tort
and probate law protections to the unborn. 175 The Webster Court
thereby acknowledged that the preamble need not be interpreted to
grant fetuses a legally recognizable interest in not being aborted, as
Judge Gerhard had suggested.'
76
Furthermore, the Court asserted that the preamble's meaning
would become an appropriate issue for federal court consideration
if the statute was ever applied "to restrict the activities of appellees
[Reproductive Health Services, a provider of abortion services] in
some concrete way. ' 177 Allowing abortion clinic protesters to use
the preamble as support for their necessity claims would concretely
169 Id. at 7.
170 Gerhard, supra note 17, at 3.
171 Id. at 3-4.
172 See Supplemental Brief for Appellant, supra note 14, at 5.
173 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3050 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
174 Id. (quoting Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 460
(1945)).
175 Id.
176 Gerhard, supra note 17, at 3-4.
177 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3050.
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restrict abortion clinic activities. Anti-abortion activists would be
able to engage in criminal activities which significantly disrupt clinic
operations without fear of legal reprisal.' 78 Such an application of
the statute might well be unconstitutional. 179
In addition, the "findings" of the Missouri legislature that fe-
tuses are unborn children with legally protectable interests in life,
health, and well-being, °80 are not unqualified. Like all state laws,
these "findings" are subject to the United States Constitution and
the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations.' 8 1 In fact, in its
1986 abortion act, the Missouri General Assembly explicitly recog-
nized this limitation. 182
Although Webster increased states' authority to regulate abor-
tions, the Webster Court left Roe's basic holding that a fetus has no
protectable right to life before viability "undisturbed."'18 3 Thus,
Missouri law cannot be interpreted to grant legal protection to a
fetus's right to life, for such an interpretation would conflict with the
Supreme Court's holding in Roe. As the O'Brien court correctly
noted, the Webster decision does not change the fact that abortion
clinic trespassers are precluded from raising a necessity defense be-
cause the "evil" they seek to avoid, abortion, threatens no legally
protected interest and is therefore not a legally recognizable
harm.184
2. Constitutional Considerations
Abortion clinic trespassers also are precluded as a matter of law
from raising a necessity defense because judicial acceptance of this
defense in abortion clinic protest cases unconstitutionally would in-
terfere with a woman's right to secure a legal abortion. Roe v. Wade,
in addition to denying legal recognition to a fetus's right to life
before viability, also recognized a constitutional "right of privacy"
which "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy."' 1 5 Although abortion rights
are not absolute, they remain virtually unqualified during the first
three months of pregnancy. 8 6 Thus, Roe granted broad constitu-
178 See infra notes 205-208 and accompanying text.
179 See infra section IV.B.2.
180 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205. (Vernon Supp. 1989).
181 State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187, 191 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
182 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.205.2; 188.010. (Vernon Supp. 1989).
183 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058.
184 O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d at 187-193.
185 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
186 During that time, "the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician." Id. at 164.
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tional protection to a women's right to obtain an abortion.
Abortion clinic trespassers, however, frequently interfere with
the exercise of constitutionally protected abortion rights. On some
occasions, for example, protesters have denied women access to
abortion facilities by entering the facilities and chaining the front
doors shut. 187 One group of protesters also blocked a clinic's emer-
gency entrance by parking a van in front of it.188 To prevent women
who already have entered an abortion clinic from obtaining abor-
tions, protesters often physically block doorways leading to abortion
procedure rooms 189 or interpose themselves between women seek-
ing abortions and clinic personnel. 190 These demonstrations fre-
quently make it impossible for abortion facilities to perform
scheduled abortions.' 9 ' In at least one case, abortion clinic protes-
ters have also had a more lasting impact on the availability of abor-
tion services. Through repeated demonstrations, in which they
photographed patients, chanted through bullhorns, blocked build-
ing entrances, and knocked over police barricades, anti-abortion ac-
tivists in Philadelphia caused an abortion clinic to lose its lease,
thereby forcing the clinic to find a new location.'
92
Abortion clinic protesters often argue, however, that as private
individuals, they are free to interfere with abortion rights despite
abortion's constitutionally protected status. 193 These protesters
note that the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade found the constitutional
right to an abortion implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment. 194 The
Fourteenth Amendment restricts state actions which unduly interfere
with personal liberties, but imposes no restrictions on the actions of
187 Bobo v. State, 757 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Crabb v. State, 754 S.W.2d
742, 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
188 Bobo, 757 S.W.2d at 60.
189 Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1345 (3d Cir. 1989);
People v. Archer, 143 Misc. 2d 390, 392, 537 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (N.Y. City Ct. 1988);
City of St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Stiso,
93 Ill. App. 3d 101, 102, 416 N.E.2d 1209, 1210 (1981); Gaetano v. United States, 406
A.2d 1291, 1292 (D.C. App. 1979); Crabb, 754 S.W.2d at 743.
190 People v. Krizka, 92 Il. App. 3d 288, 289; 416 N.E.2d 36,36 (1981). Some protes-
ters employ more drastic measures, such as handcuffing themselves to the doors of oper-
ating rooms, Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Alaska
1981), barricading themselves inside operating rooms, Commonwealth v. Wall, 372 Pa.
Super. 534, 537, 539 A.2d 1325, 1326 (1988), or attaching themselves to operating ta-
bles with, among other things, handcuffs, Cleveland, 631 P.2d at 1075, and "Superglue."
Erlandson v. State, 763 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
191 See, e.g., Krizka, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 289, 416 N.E.2d at 36-37; Archer, 143 Misc. 2d at
392, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 727; Crabb, 752 S.W.2d at 743.
192 McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1346.
193 See, e.g., Krizka, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 290, 416 N.E.2d at 37.
194 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
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private individuals.' 95 Thus, abortion foes argue that anti-abortion
demonstrations by individual protesters do not violate the Constitu-
tion, even if they substantially obstruct abortion rights, because Roe
has no affect on private anti-abortion activities. 196
Admittedly, private demonstrations which obstruct abortion
rights alone do not alone implicate the Constitution. However, ju-
dicial sanctioning of these activities through the acceptance of the
necessity defense is an unconstitutional state restriction on abortion.
As the Supreme Court held in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth,197 a state impermissibly interferes with abortion rights
when it authorizes a private individual to prevent a woman from ob-
taining an abortion. 198 In Danforth, the Court ruled that a Missouri
statute requiring a married woman to secure her husband's written
consent before obtaining a first-trimester abortion was unconstitu-
tional because it effectively granted the husband a "veto power"
over his wife's abortion decision. 199 The Court found that Roe v.
Wade prohibited states from granting this "veto power" to private
individuals:
We thus agree with the dissenting judge in the present case ... that
the State cannot 'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state
itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the
first trimester of pregnancy' .... Clearly, since the State cannot regu-
late or proscribe abortion during the first stage .... the State cannot
delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to pre-
vent abortion during that same period. 200
Like the statute at issue in Danforth, judicial acceptance of the
necessity defense in abortion clinic protest cases unconstitutionally
authorizes private individuals to interfere with abortion rights. Be-
cause their protest activities frequently prevent the performance of
legal abortions, 20 1 anti-abortion activists effectively exercise a "veto
power" over some women's constitutional abortion rights, just as
husbands could effectively exercise a "veto power" over their wives'
abortion rights under the statute struck down in Danforth. In addi-
tion, judicial acceptance of the necessity defense, like the spousal
consent statute struck down in Danforth, represents state authoriza-
195 The fourteenth amendment reads in pertinent part: "No state shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). See also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
196 See, e.g., Comment, Abortion Clinic Trespass Cases, supra note 116, at 541; Cleveland
v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Alaska 1981).
197 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
198 Id. at 67-69.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 69.
201 See supra notes 187-192 and accompanying text.
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tion for the exercise of this private "veto power" over abortion
rights. It thus grants official state sanction to the disruptive activi-
ties of anti-abortion demonstrators.
The fact that the state authorization for the exercise of a private
''veto power" in abortion clinic trespass cases comes from the
courts rather than the legislature is immaterial. A state can make
law through its courts as well as its legislature; it is well-recognized
that in the absence of contrary legislation, a judicial declaration of
policy has the force and effect of a legislative enactment. 20 2 The
proposition "[t]hat the action of state courts and judicial officers in
their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which
has long been established by decisions of [the Supreme Court]." 203
Thus, judicial acceptance of the necessity defense in abortion clinic
protest cases is legally equivalent to the passage of a statute author-
izing private individuals to block abortion clinic entrances and pre-
vent women from obtaining abortions. This state authorization of
private activities which restrict abortion rights is prohibited by
Danforth.20
4
State sanctioning of abortion clinic protests through judicial ac-
ceptance of the necessity defense can have far-reaching effects. As
one commentator has stated, "When a court justifies an illegal act, it
creates a new rule of law to govern the same dilemma in the fu-
ture." 205 Thus, judicial acceptance of the necessity defense in a sin-
gle abortion clinic protest case legally authorizes all anti-abortion
activists within the court's jurisdiction to trespass at abortion clin-
ics. 20 6 In addition, if abortion clinic protests are held to be justified,
clinic operators, abortion rights advocates, and others are legally
powerless to prevent anti-abortion activists from interfering with
202 21 CJ.S. Courts § 186 (1940). See also Self v. Wisener, 226 Ark. 58, 61, 287 S.W.2d
890, 892 (1956); State ex rel. Beil v. Mahoning Val. Distrib. Agency, Inc., 169 N.E.2d 48,
61 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1960), af'd, 116 Ohio App. 57, 186 N.E.2d 631 (1962).
203 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
204 In fact,judicial acceptance of the necessity defense in abortion clinic trespass cases
is even harder to defend than the spousal consent statute struck down in Danforth. If a
state may not constitutionally grant a "veto power" over a woman's first-trimester abor-
tion rights to the woman's husband, who arguably has a strong interest in the abortion
decision, the state certainly should not be permitted to grant a "veto power" to com-
plete strangers, whose interest in the abortion decision is much less compelling. See
Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1077, 1080 n. 15 (Alaska 1981) ("If
the legislature cannot delegate a 'veto power' to the patient's ... spouse .... we think it
unlikely that a state court could delegate such a 'veto power' to strangers, to be exer-
cised in such an obstrusive manner.").
205 Note, Criminal Trepass in an Abortion Clinic, supra note 7, at 514.
206 See supra section II.D.
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abortion rights, for third parties have no right to resist justified con-
duct.20 7 Even the police may be without authority to stop disruptive
abortion clinic demonstrations. 20 Abortion clinic protesters might
therefore continue, for an extended period of time, to prevent wo-
men from exercising their constitutional abortion rights.
This scenario was graphically illustrated in late 1977 and early
1978 in Fairfax County, Virginia. Two Fairfax County District
Court judges on separate occasions refused to convict protesters of
trespassing at the Northern Virginia Women's Medical Center, an
abortion clinic.209 One of these acquittals was based on neces-
sity.210 Following these court decisions, county prosecutors in-
structed police to stop arresting abortion clinic protesters for
trespass because they knew that they would be unable to secure con-
victions. 2 11 In addition, police expressed concern that if they at-
tempted to arrest abortion clinic demonstrators for engaging in
"justified" activities, they could be sued for violating the demonstra-
tors' civil rights.212 The demonstrations therefore continued until




The necessity defense is unavailable to abortion clinic protes-
ters as a matter of law. Although abortion clinic demonstrators may
be able to show that the "harm" they seek to avoid is not remote or
speculative, and that their protest activities are effective at prevent-
ing women from obtaining abortions, these protesters are neverthe-
less precluded from raising a necessity defense to criminal charges
arising from their protest activities. Abortion opponents have legal
alternatives by which they can air their political views, seek political
reform, and attempt to dissuade women from obtaining abortions.
Public policy concerns demand that anti-abortion activists use these
appropriate legal channels rather than committing criminal of-
207 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. See also Note, Criminal Trepass in an Abor-
tion Clinic, supra note 7, at 514.
208 Id.
209 Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1978, at B3.
210 Id. The other acquittal was based on the judge's ruling that Virginia's abortion
statute was unconstitutional. Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted an
injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, which concerns private conspiracies to violate civil
rights. The injunction was upheld. Northern Virginia Women's Medical Center v.
Balch, 617 F.2d 1045, 1047 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Cleveland v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1080-81 n.15 (Alaska 1981).
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fenses. In addition, legal and constitutional protections which have
been granted to first-trimester abortions represent a social value
choice which cannot be challenged through judicial application of
the necessity defense.
More significantly, because there is no social consensus on the
abortion issue, abortion clinic trespassers cannot claim to be acting
on the basis of shared societal values, and therefore fail to meet an
essential element of the necessity defense. Furthermore, legal first-
trimester abortions invade no legally protected interest, for fetuses
have no recognizable rights to life, health, or well-being until viabil-
ity. Abortion is therefore not a "harm" which gives rise to a neces-
sity defense. Finally, judicial acceptance of the necessity defense in
abortion clinic trespass cases violates the Constitution because it
grants state authorization to private individuals to deprive women of
their constitutionally protected abortion rights.
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